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Gigahertz quantum key distribution with InGaAs avalanche photodiodes
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We report a demonstration of quantum key distribution (QKD) at GHz clock rates with InGaAs
avalanche photodiodes (APDs) operating in a self-differencing mode. Such a mode of operation
allows detection of extremely weak avalanches so that the detector afterpulse noise is sufficiently
suppressed. The system is characterized by a secure bit rate of 2.37 Mbps at 5.6 km and 27.9 kbps
at 65.5 km when the fiber dispersion is not compensated. After compensating the fiber dispersion,
the QKD distance is extended to 101 km, resulting in a secure key rate of 2.88 kbps. Our results
suggest that InGaAs APDs are very well suited to GHz QKD applications.
Quantum key distribution (QKD)[1, 2, 3, 4] uniquely
allows two remote parties (Alice and Bob) to exchange
cryptographic keys with verifiable secrecy. Currently,
much effort has been focused on increasing the key
rate,[5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11] towards the goal of key exchange
being fast enough to offer information-theoretically se-
cure encryption of high speed data communication. QKD
with GHz clock rates[7, 8, 9] has already been demon-
strated in various optical fiber based systems with el-
evated key rates. However, due to lack of practi-
cal detectors at telecom wavelengths, periodically poled
LiNbO3 upconversion[8, 9] or superconducting nanowire
detectors,[7] had to be used. Upconversion detectors suf-
fer from high background count rates, while supercon-
ducting devices require cryogenic cooling to a few K. Nei-
ther of these devices are ideal for real-world applications.
Although widely used in the fiber-based MHz QKD
systems,[11, 12, 13, 14] InGaAs avalanche photodiodes
(APDs) have been generally regarded as unsuitable for
GHz applications due to their severe afterpulsing[15]
problem. Recently, a self-differencing technique has been
shown to suppress the afterpulse noise at high gate
frequencies.[16] It allows detection of weak avalanches
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FIG. 1: QKD experimental setup. AZMI: asymmetric Mach-
Zender interferometer; Attn: optical intensity attenuator;
PC: polarization controller; D: InGaAs APD.
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previously undetectable under conventional methods,
and as a result, the afterpulse noise is sufficiently sup-
pressed to allow APDs to be gated beyond 1 GHz.
Moreoever, the self-differencing APD requires no cryo-
genic cooling, and features a high photon count rate
(100 MHz), low dead time (< 10 ns) and low time jit-
ter (60 ps), suggesting it could be well suited to GHz
QKD applications.
In this letter, we demonstrate, for the first time, GHz
QKD with GHz-clocked InGaAs APDs. Secure key rates
of 2.37 Mbps, 684 kbps and 27.9 kbps have been achieved
for fiber lengths of 5.6 km, 25.3 km and 65.5 km respec-
tively. With fiber dispersion compensation, the QKD
distance has been extended to 101 km.
The key distribution system is based upon a
time division Mach-Zender interferometer using phase
modulation,[2, 12] as shown in Fig. 1. Photons are gener-
ated by a 1.55 µm pulsed laser operating at 1.036 GHz.
The optical pulses are strongly attenuated to the sin-
gle photon level before leaving the sender’s apparatus.
Phase modulators in the two interfering arms are used
for encoding. A polarization controller is used to recover
photon polarizations before Bob’s interferometer. Each
detected photon is recorded with a unique time stamp
using time-tagging electronics. Standard telecom fiber
SMF-28 was used in this experiment, featuring a mea-
sured optical attenuation loss of 0.195 dB/km at a wave-
length of 1550 nm.
Self-differencing circuits[16] were made with co-axial
cables of precise lengths so as to match the laser clock fre-
quency. Our InGaAs APD detectors are cooled typically
to –30 ◦C and gated with a square wave of 6.0 V ampli-
tude synchronized to the laser frequency. They have a
detection efficiency of ∼10%, dark count probability of
2.9× 10−6 — 3.3× 10−5 and an afterpulse probability of
less than 6%, depending on the bias applied.
Timing performance is of paramount importance for
high speed QKD. Figure 2 shows a time-resolved his-
togram of photon arrivals recorded with a laser illumina-
tion of 0.008 photons/pulse. Each photon peak is very
sharp, with a full width at half maximum of 60 ps, sug-
gesting precise timing measurements. Importantly, adja-
cent peaks are well separated with a 700 ps gap within
which no photons were registered at all, due to the na-
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FIG. 2: Histogram of photon detections with illumination of
an average pulse intensity of 0.008 photons at a repetition
rate of 1.036 GHz.
ture of gated operation. Such a wide separation not only
enables unambiguous bit assignment, but also aids con-
siderable noise rejection.
For experimental simplicity, we choose to implement
the standard BB84 protocol[1] with a fixed average op-
tical pulse intensity of µ = 0.2. Time-tagged photon de-
tection events are used to precisely measure the raw bit
rate (RRaw) and the QBER (e), from which the secure bit
rate after privacy amplification can be determined using
the formula[17] with a realistic error correction efficiency
fEC = 1.10,[14]
RSecure =
1
2
RRaw{1− (1 + fEC)H(e)} (1)
where 1
2
represents the BB84 protocol efficiency, and
H(e) = −elog
2
e−(1−e)log2(1−e) is the binary Shannon
entropy.[18]
Eqn. (1) would give an unconditionally secure[19] key
rate if a truly single photon source were used. The mul-
tiphoton pulses, inevitably generated by the attenuated
laser in weak pulse QKDs, open up a security threat
in which an eavesdropper, Eve, can exploit these extra
photons by performing a photon number splitting (PNS)
attack.[20, 21] However, the PNS attack is currently un-
feasible technologically, and more importantly it can be
defeated by the recently developed decoy protocol.[22, 23]
Our simulations suggest that the decoy protocol would al-
low an optimized pulse intensity of µ = 0.52–0.69, being
considerably higher than our choice of µ = 0.2, thus en-
suring that the QKD demonstrated below can be made
unconditionally secure when required in future. From
now on, the PNS attack is excluded from the security
analysis.
To permit secure key distribution, the QBER must be
lower than a certain threshold, which is ∼10% for our
case. The sources contributing to the QBER can be ap-
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FIG. 3: The quantum bit error rate (QBER), and the secure
bit rate as a function of Bob’s detection efficiency ηBob (or raw
bit rate) for a fiber link of 5.6 km. Also shown is the QBER
arising from the apparatus imperfection (eopt) and detector
dark counts (ed).
proximated as
e ≈ [eopt +
1
2
Pa] + [ed + eb] (2)
where eopt is the error due to apparatus imperfec-
tions, such as interferometer mis-alignment and mis-
modulation; Pa is the APD afterpulse probability, and
the coefficient 1
2
represents the fact that an afterpulse
event has equal probabilities to produce a correct or an
erroneous bit. These first two terms are fiber distance
independent. ed is the contribution from the detector
dark counts. eb is the interclock interference due to pulse
broadening, existing only in high speed QKD systems,
where an optical pulse may temporally spread into the
neighboring clock cycle due to broadening caused by fiber
dispersion. Both ed and eb are fiber length dependent and
significant for long fibers, but are typically negligible at
short fiber distances (≤25 km). eopt is estimated to be
0.9%, based on the interferometer visibility (99.4%) and
mis-modulation. Pa depends on the APD bias,[16] but
was found to be below 6% when the detection efficiency
is not greater than 10%. As shown below, Pa is the dom-
inating error source.
It is clear from Eqn. (1) that a high raw bit rate and
a low QBER are desirable to have a high secure bit rate.
However, it is not possible to achieve both simultane-
ously. Increasing the raw bit rate by raising the detection
efficiency always causes an increase in the QBER due to
increased dark count rate and afterpulse probability. A
trade-off must be made in order to achieve the optimal
secure key rate. To find the optimal operating conditions,
we tune the APD DC bias and hence vary the raw bit
rate and the QBER. Figure 3 shows the measured QBER
(solid circles) and the secure bit rate (solid square) for
a 5.6-km fiber link as a function of Bob’s detection effi-
ciency ηBob (including Bob’s optical loss). The raw bit
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FIG. 4: Raw (solid squares) and secure (open squares) bit
rates as a function of fiber length. The inset shows the quan-
tum bit error rate (QBER). 75 km and 101 km results were
obtained with pre-compensation of fiber chromatic dispersion.
rate increases six-fold from 3.1 Mbps to 18.2 Mpbs due
to the increased detection efficiency. The QBER, which
is as low as 1.55% at low detection efficiencies, increases
monotonically, due to the increased noise, and eventu-
ally exceeds the security limit of ∼10%. The QBER due
to the optical imperfection (eopt) and the dark counts
(ed) is also plotted, which makes only a small fraction of
the total QBER at high detection efficiencies, suggesting
that the detector afterpulse may be the dominating error
source. The secure bit rate, calculated using Eqn. (1),
is highest at an intermediate detection efficiency. The
secure bit rate, which is 1.19 Mbps at low detection ef-
ficiency, doubles to 2.37 Mbps for a detection efficiency
between 4% and 6%. Further increasing the detector bias
causes a sharp drop in secure bit rate, illustrating that
the privacy amplification cost exceeds the gain in raw
bit rate. The optimal detector bias was then used for
fiber length dependence experiments, corresponding to
ηBob=6.0%, which gives the optimal secure bit rates over
the fiber distances studied.
We perform QKD experiments over various fiber dis-
tances up to 65.5 km. The raw bit rate, as shown in
Fig. 4, decreases with fiber length at a rate of 0.24
dB/km. This rate is higher than the measured optical
attenuation loss of 0.195 dB/km, because of the addi-
tional dispersion loss, as described later. The raw bit
rate is 9.16 Mbps at 5.6 km fiber, falling to 348 kbps at
65.5 km. The measured QBER is shown in the inset of
Fig. 4. It remains fairly constant for short fibers below
25 km, but increases with fiber length for longer lengths
due to a combination of the falling photon rate and the
increasing deleterious dispersive pulse broadening. eb is
estimated to be 2.1% for 65.5 km fiber, exceeding the con-
tribution from the detector dark count (ed). Nonetheless,
even without fiber dispersion compensation, the QBER
at 65.5 km is well below the security limit ∼10%, allowing
secure keys to be formed. The calculated secure bit rate
follows the raw bit rate, decreasing exponentially with
fiber distance. The secure bit rate is determined to be
684 kbps, and 27.9 kbps for 25.3 and 65.5 km respectively.
Secure key exchange over distances much longer than
65 km is not possible without compensation of disper-
sion of the fiber. The standard fibers used here have a
chromatic dispersion of 17 ps/(nm·km) at 1550 nm. The
chromatic dispersion of the fiber broadens the laser pulse,
such that a fraction of photons are dispersed out of the
APD detection gate. This causes the raw bit rate to drop
more rapidly (0.24 dB/km) with fiber length than ex-
pected from the optical attenuation (0.195 dB/km). Fur-
thermore, the fiber dispersion also causes temporal over-
lap of adjacent optical pulses, resulting in an increased
interclock interference and error rate. Either effect de-
teriorates the QKD performance. In fact, the QBER is
measured to be 17% for 75.8 km fiber, having exceeded
the security limit, due largely to the contribution of the
dispersive broadening (eb > 10%).
We use a fiber Bragg grating device at Alice’s side to
pre-compensate the fiber dispersion. As shown in the
inset of Fig. 4, the QBERs at 75.8 km and 101.1 km
have now been reduced to 6.30% and 7.80%, respectively,
well below the security limit, thus allowing secure key
exchange to take place. The secure key rate is determined
to be 19.0 kbps and 2.88 kbps for 75.8 and 101.1 km
respectively, as shown in Fig. 4.
Finally, we would like to point out that the experi-
ment described here is only a proof-of-principle demon-
stration. To achieve a complete GHz QKD system, there
are still remaining challenges, such as remote synchro-
nization, high speed real-time error correction and pri-
vacy amplification, to be addressed.
In summary, we have demonstrated GHz QKD with
high bit rate using self-differencing InGaAs APDs over
up to 101.1 km standard telecom fiber. The secure bit
rate is determined to be 2.37 Mbps for a 5.6 km long fiber,
and decreases exponentially to 2.88 kbps for 101.1 km.
We conclude that that InGaAs APDs are suitable for
long distance GHz QKD systems. These results open the
prospect of low cost and practical high bandwidth GHz
QKD systems for future applications.
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